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Abstract
It is assumed that observed labor income is the result of three stages across the job search 
process.  From the  reservation  wage  formation,  the  bargaining  between  employers  and 
potential employees when the match, and finally a possible additional adjustment once the 
worker is completely hired. This paper provides a methodological proposal and an intuitive 
estimation of the wage gain due to the presence of labor market imperfections across those 
three stages. 
The part  of the wage that is  explained by labor markets  imperfections  is estimated by 
performing a stochastic  frontier  model with panel data belonging to the Mexican labor 
survey  -ENOE-.  The  results  suggest  that  82.7% of  the  variance  of  the  wages  of  the 
subordinated workers is explained by market imperfections. Moreover, public labor offices 
and small firms are negatively correlated with their presence. 
JEL Classification: J21; J31.
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1. Introduction
The labor income of a typical worker is the observable outcome of a complex process 
shaped by the overall  competence conditions  of the labor market  before a job offer  is 
accepted and once the recruitment is completed. But the basic question that still remains by 
theoretically and empirically unanswered is how this outcome may differ among similar 
workers.   As  the  explanations  might  be  diverse,  the  answer  does  not  only  entail  the 
analysis of the current conditions of employees, but also the circumstances under which 
unemployed workers performed the job search task and their reservation wage formation. 
There are three stages that  intervene in the determination of wage levels,  from the job 
search process through the duration of unemployment to the job offer acceptance and an 
eventual  and subsequent  wage adjustment.  At a previous starting point,  the reservation 
wages offer a lower bound and a starting point of the final labor income assignment. As 
long as agents interact  depending on the exposure of the workers to the labor  markets 
imperfections upon each one of these stages, an observable gain above that reservation 
wage would probably arise. 
In a competitive market, firms or employers would not have an incentive to pay wages 
over those reservation wages in accordance given their productivity level but, certainly, 
observable  wages  become  a  representative  symptom  of  how  the  competitive  result  is 
modified  and a  cause  of  why the  labor  market  is  not  cleared  (Fields,  2007).   If  it  is 
supposed  that  similar  workers  would  have  the  same  level  of  reservation  wages,  the 
differences in their observable wages would depend on the supply side (i.e. ability,  job 
search  preferences,  etc.).  Other  source  of  differences  emerges  with  the  presence  of 
situations from the demand side such as prejudiced preferences, biased assessments of a 
worker’s  productivity,  asymmetric  information  or  monopsony  power.  The  latter  are 
examples of the most common labor market imperfections that might play an essential role 
in the matching process of employees and employers and might intervene in the formation 
of wages (Van Klopin & Singell, 1996). 
Similarly, as corroborated by the labor literature, these market imperfections are seldom 
studied as a whole. Although they have been studied separately, the quantification of their 
effect on wages between workers and employers has been practically ignored. For instance, 
since Stigler (1962) addressed the information in the search stage of wage formation it 
became the most  studied issue.  Rogerson et  al  (2005)  address  bargaining  power in  an 
attempt to obtain conclusions about the employers – employees relation. Baldwin (1991) 
exhibits a labor discrimination model among black and white workers. Arnott & Stiglitz 
(1985) and Arnott et al (1988) broadly assess the labor turnover conditions and van den 
Berg (2003) surveys the consequences of the existence of minimum wages as an inhibitor 
of monopsony power.  
Why similar workers earn different wages is an issue that has been theoretically addressed 
but  at  the  same  time  is  has  been  barely quantified  and rarely connected  with  a  wage 
formation process. As an attempt to contribute to the empirical analysis of labor markets, 
the main purpose of this document is to quantify the proportion of the wages that is caused 
by the labor market imperfections in Mexico as a possible explanation of the consequent 
job mismatching effect. 
Employing data from the “Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo-ENOE”1 for the first 
semester  of  2009,  a  stochastic  frontier  (Greene,  2003)  is  estimated  as  part  of  a 
methodology that intuitively separates the part of the earnings originated by human capital 
from the market imperfection effect.  
The document  is  organized as follows: The next  section addresses the importance  and 
relevance of studying of labor market imperfections, their job mismatching consequences 
across the wage formation stages and the econometric method that allows us to subtract the 
proportion  of  the  wage due to  job mismatching  from the observable  wages.  The  third 
section  briefly  describes  the  data  and  some  relevant  aggregates  of  the  Mexican  labor 
market. The fourth section presents the results of the estimations. Finally, the fifth section 
presents the implications and conclusions of the previous exercise. 
2. Intuition on labor markets imperfection and wages formation
2.1 A brief review of the theory
In the job search stage, reservation wages determine the core of what will be the final 
observed wage once the employee is hired in a new job. The existence of inherent worker 
properties  shapes  the  minimum amount  of  money  that  he  or  she  would  be  willing  to 
receive to accept a vacancy according to its optimal labor supply plan. Number of children, 
marital status, gender, location and some others characteristics of workers contribute to the 
variations of that amount of money or in kind payment amongst them. Examples of these 
empirical findings are found in Owen (1971), Heckman and Willis (1979) or Heckman 
(1986),  who  have  employed  empirical  labor  market  participation  models  to  determine 
which characteristic holds a higher weight (see also Moffitt and Wolfe, 1992; Siegfried et  
al, 1993).
The characterization of reservation wage models has treated it as a constant variable over 
time (Kiefer and Neumann, 1979) even during the job search when it works as an essential 
input of the seeker’s stopping rule as shown by Mortensen (1986). Nevertheless, evidence 
of a decreasing reservation wage as long as unemployment duration was found in empirical 
studies such as Blau (1991) who does not only include an expected wage offer but rather 
the expected number of workable hours as the solution of the worker’s labor supply plan. 
Thus,  even though one source of  overall  wages  decrease throughout  negative  business 
cycles is the reaction that reservation wages have when consequently the unemployment 
duration increases. Besides business cycle, the lack of information about vacancies might 
worsen the situation of unemployed workers whose labor income comes down when they 
don´t know where employers are and duration increases.
Information on vacancies is the first element that job seekers attempt to retrieve once the 
unemployment begins. The better the information one gets, the better a job offer is in terms 
1 A possible translation would be “National Survey on Occupancy and Employment”. It is a panel-based 
survey carried out since year 2005. Further information at http://www.inegi.org.mx
of its remuneration (Bloemen, 2005) that modifies the worker’s reservations wage. Several 
studies have shown that job seekers prefer direct information sources, such as “relatives 
and  friends”  or  “directly  at  the  work  place”  (Kahn  and  Low,  1990)  over  indirect 
information sources like Labor Market Intermediaries (Autor, 2008). The main reason why 
this happens is that the cost of information is smaller using the direct sources than using 
the indirect sources, determined by the job seeker’s characteristics and his or her optimal 
level of demand for information.
Therefore, asymmetric information is the first imperfection that job seekers and employers 
generate  in  the  labor  market,  firstly  because  employers  cannot  predict  the  potential 
productivity of a given worker and because the latter cannot predict the real conditions of 
an accepted job offer (most of the jobs characteristics are revealed after recruitment and 
not  during  the  job  search  task).  For  example,  Mavromaras  et  al  (2009)  survey  over-
education as the most important concern of workers and a subsequent job mismatching 
issue  in  the  presence  of  the  asymmetric  information  that  leads  to  the  unavoidable 
dissatisfaction of workers or firms. This causes undesirable and costly job turnover and 
hence, employers decide to hire those workers with potential  specific skills in terms of 
trainability, productivity and the least-likely to give up (Salop and Salop, 1976).
Although wage discrimination has led the vast amount of theory assessments and empirical 
evidence  (specially  for  gender)  as  well  as  significant  pool  of  causes  of  labor  market 
segregation2. During the job search stage of wage formation firms or employers do not 
only have specific preferences for workers but rather job seekers aim their search towards 
those jobs that brings them a considerable satisfaction. For instance, men and women often 
do quite different jobs because men have less risk aversion than women (Cobb-Clarck and 
Tan, 2009). 
Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) offer an interesting approach in the transition from 
the first to the second stage of this survey on wage formation and its relation with markets 
imperfection. They question how there may be unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies 
at the same time and argue that “Workers do not encounter firms completely at random but  
try  to  locate  those  posting  attractive  terms  of  trade3”.  They  conclude  that  their  job 
bargaining models are linked to the available matching technology in the job search and 
job offer process. 
The availability of empirical evidence on wage differentials and job bargaining has shown 
that in the absence of unions, a worker’s productivity determines further wage adjustments. 
Bartolucci (2009) manages matched employer-employee data in Germany, showing that 
wage disparities between genders are explained in large part by differences in productivity 
and by a smaller part by segregation or the firms’ preferences. 
2 See for example Carroll and Rolph (1973), Swinton (1977), Gannon and Zenou (1997), Heckman (1998), 
Aslund and Rooth (2005).
3 Rogerson,  R.  Robert,  S.  Wright, R.  Search-Theoretic  Models of  the Labor  Market: A Survey.  Journal of 
Economic Literature. Vol. XLIII (December 2005), pp. 959-988. Pp. 961.
The existence of unions is an important element in the wage formation through its third 
and final stage as well. They play an essential role in sorting out the wage inequalities 
originated in the firms’ predominant bargaining power and provide an explanation of why 
wage gaps are sharper when unionization does not take place (Card, 2001). Nonetheless, as 
referenced by Bemmels (1987) for the US manufacturing industry,  unions are often the 
source of a possible mismatching of wages and the real productivity that they represent. As 
Wessels  (1985)  affirms,  “(…)  Unions  must  decrease  employment  far  more  than  is  
commonly thought, or they do not substantially increase the productivity of firm4”. 
2.2 Intuition on the methodology 
The  intuition  behind  the  estimation  of  the  part  of  the  labor  income  originated  by the 
influence  of  the  market  imperfections  on  the  wage formation  process  begins  with  the 
generic specification of the classic Mincer (1974) equation. From the latter it is only drawn 
its theoretical components rather than an attempt to assess the returns to schooling. The 
specification for each employee i in period t is:
∑
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Where the core variables of the covariates jitx  are commonly denominated education and 
experience (or rather, worker’s age). Arbitrarily it is complemented by the number of hours 
worked per month ( whm ) and the economic sector ( sector ) where the employee actually 
works. In any econometric context the error term  ite  is the part of the observable labor 
income itwln  that is not explained by the covariates jitx  and hence, if two workers have 
the same age, education, worked hours per month and economic sector, the differences in 
their wage would be incorporated into their own error component. Thus, the larger is the 
exposure of workers to the presence of labor market imperfections, the greater the error 
term ite  is.
The stochastic frontier model divides ite  into two error terms:
it it ite uν= + (2)
Where  ),0(~ 2v
iid
it Nv σ , is the part of the wage differences among similar workers due to 
idiosyncratic  exceptional  characteristics  which  are  also  personals  traits  commonly 
described  as  “abilities”5.  The  error  term  ),(~ 2v
iid
it Nu σµ+ ,  reflects  the  wage  gained  by 
employees as a consequence of the existence of labor market imperfections. 
4 Wessels, W. The Effects of Unions on Employment and Productivity: An Unresolved Contradiction. Journal 
of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1, Part 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 101-108. Pp. 108.
5 These cognitive and non-cognitive abilities are also estimated by Heckman et al (2006) or Cawley et al 
(2001).  This  is  an alternative to the estimation of  this  term, even though this  is  not  the focus  of  this 
assessment. 
Thus,  under  competitive  conditions  the  labor  income  amongst  workers  with  the  same 
characteristics would differ only by itν , or simultaneously, by their ability gain. Therefore, 
after the estimation of equation 1 the rest of the heterogeneity of the observable wage, ( itu
),  does  not  have  any other  explanation  besides  the  role  of  markets  in  generating  this 
differential. Regardless its origin, across the stages of wage formation it is not controllable 
by workers6. 
It is necessary to point out that regarding our theoretical context, the part of equation 1 that 
reveals the reservation wage of a given worker i comes up when itu  is subtracted from it 
(Hofler and Murphy, 1994). An employer with perfect information would not pay itu  but it 
emerges over the three stages of wage formation, from the job search, the job matching and 
a subsequent adjustment.
Given that  data  have an evident  unbalanced panel  framework because of re-contacting 
failures, Greene (2003) explains two restrictions of a feasible time-invariant specification 
for equation 1. First, that a time invariant heterogeneity would yield a bias estimation of iu  
and  supposes  independence  between the  whole  error  and the  covariates  of  the  model. 
Second as the model supposes a time-invariance of iu , even though the time span of the 
data (two quarters), it is preferable to generalize the specification of the model over a time-
variant  basis.  Thus,  substituting  the  random  parameter  ite  of  the  equation  2  into  the 
equation 1 is rewritten as follows7:
1
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Where  itu  is  achieved  by  including  one  dummy  for  each  individual.  Under  any 
specification of equation 3, in the end it is performed a generalization of itu  term proposed 
by Battese and Coelli (1995) where it is changed into the expression,
( )it T
it iu e u
η− −
= (4)
That allows the model to adapt the variation of the market imperfection term across time 
and individuals. If η  is statistically equals to zero, the model would yield a time-invariant 
random effect estimation. This stochastic frontier model in addition produces a parameter 
2 2 2/ ( )u u vγ σ σ σ= + manifesting the proportion to which the markets imperfections explain 
the variation of wages for similar employees. Later γ  becomes the center of our analysis.
6 See for instance Boehm and Hofler (1987) where this technique is implemented to also separate markets 
effects on prices.
7 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for further explanation on this specification. 
3. Data and Mexican labor markets
The data for the estimation of equation 3 belongs to the National Survey of Occupation and 
Employment-ENOE8,  continually  carried  out  in  124.260  dwellings  by  the  National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography-INEGI9. The thematic coverage of the survey entails 
gender and age composition of the national inhabitants and the labor composition of the 
working age population. It is stratified on rural and urban areas of the 32 Mexican states 
over a continuous periodicity and a quarterly report (it follows up most of the observations 
on a panel structure). 
The time scheme of the ENOE involves a continuous fieldwork across the whole year, but 
given that the re-contact of the households does not remain stable over time, the selected 
periods for the estimation of equation 3 are the first two quarters of 2009, which allows us 
to find more accurate information of the reported households in a previous period10. The 
loss of people quarter by quarter averages about 25% of them, and after one year there is 
not trace of any dwelling. For instance, 76.3% of the people that were polled in I-2009 
appear again in II-2009 while the rest is expected to be in III-2009.
Now, the focus of the periods I-2009 and II-2009 is placed on the main indicators of the 
Mexican labor markets in order to understand the structure, the potential role and scope of 
the labor market imperfections. As part of our initial description, it is firstly presented the 
hierarchical decomposition of the population of Mexico with a Working Age Population 
between 15 and 65 years of age:
Hierarchical Decomposition of the Labor Force (Hierarchical rates)
 Period: I-2009 II-2009
0. Total population 100.0 100.0
1. Population six years and above 89.4 89.5
1.1 Child population (6-14 years of age) 20.3 20.0
1.1.1 Child laborers 2.7 2.9
1.2 Population 65+ years of age 9.3 9.4
1.2.1 Employed 21.0 21.8
1.3 Working age population (15-64 years of age) 70.4 70.6
1.3.1 Inactive 37.4 37.2
1.3.2 Active 62.6 62.8
1.3.2.1 Employed 94.8 94.6
1.3.2.2 Unemployed 5.2 5.4
Table 1: Hierarchical decomposition of the Labor Force.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
The Mexican working age population has been recognized for holding the lowest rates of 
labor participation (IADB, 2004). The active population rate reached a level less than the 
Latin-American  rate  and its  unemployment  rate  barely had been above 5% in the  last 
decade. A slower business rhythm has led Mexicans to increase their labor participation 
8 Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo.
9 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía - http://www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/default.aspx.
10 Using more than two quarters would lead to a small re-contract of individual and a low track of them 
along time. Find out more information at INEGI’s homepage. 
between I-2009 and II-2009 that was absorbed by the unemployment rate rather than the 
employment rate. 
Additionally, the distribution of employees among sectors and education levels reveals a 
concentration of workers in the service sector and among those who have reached the high 
school education level. During this period, the re-arrangements among these shares also 
shows and trend towards an increase of  level  of  education  of Mexican  workers  and a 
higher participation of them in the service and agricultural sectors:
Distribution of the Employed - Level of Education
Level of education % I-2009 II-2009
Incomplete elementary 14.9 14.4
Elementary 22.2 21.6
High school 33.8 34.0
Technical 14.4 14.8
Graduate 14.7 15.1
Not specified 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Table 2: Distribution of employees – Level of Education.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
Distribution of the Employed by Economic 
Sector
Sector of economic activity 
% I-2009 II-2009
Construction 8.4 8.3
Manufacturing 15.8 15.3
Commerce 19.6 19.6
Services 42.8 43.2
Others 1.0 1.0
Agriculture 11.7 12.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Table 3: Distribution of employees by Economic Sector.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
The mobility of workers to the service and agricultural sectors was accompanied by an 
increase of self-employed (non-subordinated) and non-remunerated workers as shown in 
table 4:
Employment Categories, Shares in Total Employment
Occupational category I-2009 II-2009
Remunerated workers 69.0 68.0
Employers 4.2 4.3
Self-employed 20.9 21.4
Non-remunerated workers 5.9 6.2
Table 4: Employment categories, shares in total employment.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
A possible symptom of a superfluous inflow of workers in the service sector has turned out 
between  these  two  periods  given  the  observed  changes  in  the  work  categories  and 
economic  sectors  share.  Spite  of  the  fact  that  the  employment  in  the  service  sector 
increased, it yielded a lesser share of remunerated workers that coincided with a decrease 
of the share of workers in the construction and manufacturing sectors (presented in table 
3). Regarding unemployment, table 5 presents its rates and shares among groups of gender, 
age, area of residence and level of education. It is possible to notice an important share of 
youth and males in the overall unemployment share and a low sharing of rural areas:
Unemployment Rates Among Groups
 Unemployment Rate by Groups %  
Group Share Among 
Unemployed %
Period: I-2009 II-2009 I-2009 II-2009
Gender   
Female 5.2 5.0 37.3 35.0
Male 5.3 5.6 62.7 65.0
Age   
15-24 9.6 10.0 38.6 39.3
25-54 4.2 4.2 56.5 55.4
55-64 2.8 3.1 4.9 5.3
Area of residence   
Urban 5.3 5.3 92.7 90.9
Rural 4.7 5.8 7.3 9.1
Level of education   
Incomplete elementary 3.3 3.4 9.3 9.0
Elementary 5.0 4.7 21.0 18.9
High school 5.9 6.1 38.5 39.4
Technical 6.7 6.9 18.7 19.3
Graduate 4.5 4.8 12.5 13.4
Table 5: Unemployment rate among groups.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
Despite almost all groups obtained an increase on their unemployment rates, It can be also 
inferred that males, youths, urban inhabitants and technicians who mostly seek jobs. Since 
the share of workers holding high school education is the largest group of employees in the 
Mexican labor markets, they represent the highest rate of the unemployment share among 
level of education groups. 
One starting  points  of  the  previous  theoretical  review is  the  job  search  stage  and  the 
information sources that job seekers account on. The ENOE enquires what actions they do 
to  find  out  the  information  on  vacancies,  which  are  grouped  into  direct  and  indirect 
mechanisms differed by how costly they are (recall that direct mechanisms are the least 
costly). 
Unemployed workers - job search mechanisms Type I-2009 II-2009
1 Directly at the work place Direct 75.4% 76.2%
2 At a private labor office Indirect 2.2% 1.7%
3 At a public labor office Indirect 2.0% 1.8%
4 A temporary program of public jobs Direct 1.3% 1.5%
5 Attempt to start a own business Direct 0.8% 1.0%
6 On line - Internet Indirect 7.5% 9.2%
7 A public announcement Indirect 10.0% 9.2%
8 A labor union or group Direct 0.7% 0.8%
9 A friend or relative Direct 16.6% 14.9%
10 A Classified ad Indirect 2.4% 2.6%
11 Does not know  1.1% 1.4%
Table 6: Unemployed workers - job search mechanisms.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
These  job  search  mechanisms  are  not  exclusive  and  hence  job  seekers  might  find 
information on vacancies using one or more sources. It is evident that rationally, Mexicans 
prefer  direct  mechanisms  that  are  more  restrictive  in  terms of the flow of  information 
between employers and unemployed workers.  For instance, in table 6 it is seen that a 
75.4% and  16.6% of  job  seekers  look  for  information  directly  at  the  work  place  and 
through  a  friend  or  relative  in  I-2009,  respectively.  Even  though  labor  markets 
intermediaries  are  less  restrictive  in  the  flow of  information,  they  are  barely  used  in 
Mexico.  However,  the  Internet  has  become  an  important  source  and  alternative  for 
unemployed workers in comparison to alternate government agencies. 
Table 7 presents the job search mechanisms of employees before they were hired:
Employed  - job search mechanisms I-2009
1 Directly at the work place 19.9%
2 At a private labor office 0.2%
3 At a public labor office 0.2%
4 A temporary program of public jobs 0.2%
5 A labor union or group 1.2%
6 On line - Internet 1.1%
7 A public announcement 7.8%
8 A friend or relative 56.0%
9 Someone offered a vacant 11.0%
10 Other 1.0%
11 Does not know 1.3%
Table 7: Employees - job search mechanisms.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009.
Table 6 is compared to table 7 which presents how employed actually found information 
about his or her current job in the period I-2009 (not available for II-2009). This contrast 
demonstrates  de effectiveness of direct  mechanism during the job search and matching 
stages, particularly for those who learned about a job through a person close to them. Here 
the proportions are switched: as consequence of not finding any response directly at the 
work place, the observed proportion for friends or relatives reaches 56%11. 
Another important issue to address is the distribution of wages among education levels and 
economic  sectors.  Tables  6  and  7  present  the  Gini  coefficients  of  wages  earned  by 
employees  during the first  two quarters of 2009 that are relevant in the study of wage 
differences. It is worth to notice a systematic increase of the concentration of wages across 
this period. Agriculture was the only sector with a decrease in the concentration of wages, 
though it is the most inequitable amongst the others.
 
11 See Appendix 1 for further details in Mexican States. 
Gini Coefficient by Level of Education. 
Level of education I-2009 II-2009
Incomplete elementary 38.5 39.2
Elementary 35.1 36.2
High school 34.0 34.3
Technical 36.6 36.0
Graduate 37.2 38.2
Not specified 31.4 24.7
Total 40.7 41.4
Table 8: Gini coefficient by level of education.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
Gini Coefficient by Sector of Economic Activity
Gini coefficient I-2009 II-2009
Construction 29.7 30.3
Manufacturing 37.3 38.0
Commerce 41.0 41.5
Services 40.1 40.9
Others 36.9 38.7
Agriculture 44.4 44.1
Total 40.7 41.4
Table 9: Gini coefficient by sector of economic activity.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
The Gini coefficient among levels of education has a U-shaped in Mexico. The distribution 
of  wages  for  low educated  workers  is  similar  to  those  who have  a  Graduate  level  of 
education, while the Gini coefficient reaches a minimum level for employees with a high 
school degree. 
4. Estimations and results
The estimation of equation 3 is explained in this section and the estimation of the error 
terms for the Mexican states is detailed in the Appendix 2. Besides the covariates included 
in  jitx  previously mentioned in section 2.1, it was also incorporated the inverse of Mills 
ratio (Heckman,  1979) as a correction of the selection of remunerated workers in each 
period  separately12.  The  values  of  the  parameter  2 2 2/ ( )u u vγ σ σ σ= + were  derived  in  a 
second stage of a post-estimation procedure of the stochastic frontier on the time-variant 
model. It is also calculated a pseudo R-squared as a proxy of the determination coefficient 
for the overall model plus for the estimations amongst states. This is carried out applying 
the formula:
( )2 1 ln / lnR URpseudoR L L= −  (4)
Where URL  stands for the log-likelihood of the unrestricted model (only with its constant 
term) and RL  for the restricted term (including covariates).
4.1 Overall model
The  estimations  of  the  model  for  the  nationwide  data  yielded  a  pseudo determination 
coefficient  of  19.2%,  which  means  that  the  power  of  prediction  of  the  estimated 
coefficients is not strong. Nevertheless, accordingly with these kinds of studies and the 
specification methods supports satisfactorily a good fit of the model. In addition, as the 
results are aimed at explaining a part of the Mexican’s wages using a stochastic frontier 
analysis, the central attention here is paid on the error term. As well, the estimations of 
equation 3 present a starting point of what Hofler and Murphy (1994) called  reservation 
wages but for the purpose of this document they represent the base line of wages in the 
first stage of their formation:
12 The inverse of Mills ratio included the variables gender, marital status, household’s head, head’s age and 
education, average of household’s age, urban area).
Mexico - Stochastic Frontier Estimates
 iwln
Coefficien
t
Std. 
Error
iedu 0.049 0.00 ***
iage 0.031 0.00 ***
2
iage 0.000 0.00 ***
iwhm 0.003 0.00 ***
2
iwht 0.000 0.00 ***
iingmanufactur 0.127 0.01 ***
iservices 0.132 0.00 ***
imills -0.203 0.00 ***
constant 6.386 0.01 **
  
η -0.010 0.00 ***
  
2σ 0.499 0.01
γ 0.827 0.00
2
uσ 0.412 0.01
2
vσ 0.086 0.00  
pseudo R2 19.2%   
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%.
Table 10: Stochastic Frontier Estimates.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
It turned out that the estimation of  γ  leads it to infer that 82.7% of the variation of the 
heterogeneity among Mexican workers is explained by labor markets imperfections and the 
rest 17.3%, is due to the exceptional conditions of the workers that are also a part of their 
human  capital.  These  results  also  suggest  that  this  variation  has  a  decreasing  and 
significant rate over time since the coefficient η  obtained a negative value.  These findings 
advise that in spite of the fact that Mexico counts on several job search mechanisms and 
strict labor laws (Levy, 2008), if two workers are similar in their skills and qualifications 
the  differences  between  their  wages  are  not  mostly  explained  by  their  individual  and 
specific conditions but rather the nature of the labor markets they face. Both start the wage 
formation process from a similar condition but as long as they interact with employers, 
match them or receive further adjustments, their wages get different paths over time. 
Furthermore, if the statistical inference on  η  would have yielded a coefficient equals to 
zero,  one had concluded that  these variations  were expected  to  be constant  over  time. 
Nevertheless, in this case the implications entail that despite the estimations were obtained 
using a two period data, the perspectives on the prevalence of the market imperfection will 
fade (ceteris paribus) in the future at a rate of -1% quarterly. As remarked before, under the 
absence of market  imperfections  the proportion of wages explained by them would be 
indeed equals to zero. Since the model has the restriction of non-negative values of iu , it 
was not sensible to think of a negative effect of markets on wages below their base line 
because otherwise workers would remain inactive. Besides, our theoretical framework puts 
the  interaction  between  job  seekers  and  employers  as  a  wage  gaining  process  that 
mismatch the productivity of a given worker to the real requirements of a vacancy. 
The estimation of the coefficients for the covariates of the model allowed it to estimate the 
ratio ii wu ln/  in addition to the single parameter 2uσ . The average proportion of wage that 
corresponds to the markets imperfection effect obtained an average of 0.052 and a standard 
deviation  of  0.03.  Even though this  proportion  seems small  it  determines  most  of  the 
variation among wages while the idiosyncratic component apparently is not such volatile. 
The next chart plots the density distribution of  ii wu ln/ covering more than 90% of the 
individuals between 0 and 0.15:
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Figure 1: Non-parametric histogram of ii wu ln/ .
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
This  non-negligible  part  of  the  wages  explained  by factors  besides  human  capital  and 
abilities is also compared to the circumstances of the employee that lead to a large or small 
iu .  The  variations  of  this  parameter  depend  on  the  degree  in  which  the  markets 
imperfections were presented during the wage formation process. 
As pointed out before, the job search process has an essential role in the determination of 
wages and the success of job seekers accepting a wage offer above their reservation wage. 
It is now presented the partial correlations of iu with respect to covariates that theoretically 
may mitigate or spur the presence of market imperfections :
ii wu ln/
Partial correlations for iu
 Union member 0.0718 ***
 Written contract 0.0424 ***
Jo
b 
se
ar
ch
Directly at the work place -0.0128 ***
At a private labor office 0.005
At a public labor office -0.0115 ***
A temporary program of public jobs -0.016 ***
A labor union or group 0.0107 ***
On line - Internet 0.0308 ***
A public announcement -0.0291 ***
A friend or relative -0.004
Someone offered a vacant 0.0098 ***
Other 0.0145 ***
Fi
rm
 si
ze
1 person -0.0546 ***
2 - 5 people -0.0382 ***
6 - 10 people -0.0086 **
11 - 15 people -0.001
16 - 20 people 0.0061 *
21 - 30 people 0.0107 ***
31 - 50 people 0.0114 ***
51 - 100 people 0.0168 ***
101 - 250 people 0.0192 ***
251 - 500 people 0.0187 ***
500 and more people 0.0513 ***
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%.
Table 11: Partial correlations for ui.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009.
In spite of the fact that the correlations are low, they manifest the direction of the behavior 
of each covariate jointly with iu . For instance, besides having a written contract, being part 
of a labor union presented de higher positive correlation and leads the differences among 
wages in the third stage of wage formation. As mentioned, unions often exercise power to 
increase wages even if the real productivity of a given employee does not match his or her 
wage.
Moreover, the job search mechanisms give us the chance to infer on the evolution of wages 
from the job search stage. The analysis is divided into those sources with a least restrictive 
information flow and the others that enable the existence of asymmetric information.  In 
this manner, even though asking for information to friends or relatives obtained a tiny and 
non-significant and negative partial correlation, the signs of the other search mechanisms 
were those expected and predictable by the theory.
The firm size draws a singular attention because it has a negative correlation among small 
ones and a higher positive correlation among the rest. This finding suggest that the firm 
size is a key factor in the markets imperfection condition in Mexico, and that larger firms 
measured by the number of workers are correlated with non-competitive outcomes on the 
markets. As large firms have better possibilities to offer higher wages and to train workers 
at their own expense, it is even less costly to replace a vacant.  
4.2 The State level estimation
Appendix 2 presents the estimations of equation 3 for Mexican States and makes possible 
the  comparison  among  them.  This  sub-national  analysis  is  aimed  at  understanding 
particular  characteristics  of segmented regional  labor  markets.  The regional  differences 
contribute  to  identify  the  sources  of  the  labor  markets  imperfections  replicating  the 
previous table 9. 
The description of table A3 starts firstly focusing on the time-varying parameter  η . This 
estimates  divide  the  Mexican  States  into  three  groups where  the  market  imperfections 
component of wages is fixed over time (e.g. Aguascalientes, Puebla and Tabasco), some 
other where η  determines an increasing  iu  (Colima, Chiapas and Guanajuato) and the rest 
where it is expected to decrease (Baja California, Chihuahua, Distrito Federal, Morelos, 
Sonora, Tlaxcala and Veracruz). It is evident that Chihuahua is the State with the highest 
negative  value  of  the  time-varying  parameter,  which  entails  a  decreasing  trend  of  the 
market imperfections component for the employees located there.  The implications of this 
division of Mexican States and their characterization of the labor markets would detour our 
attention, but in any case this could be the beginning of a future follow up estimation of the 
equation 3.  
The second and most  important  parameter  of the estimation output in table  A3, is  the 
proportion  of  the  variance  of  the  heterogeneity  of  wages  explained  by  market 
imperfections,  γ . It turned out that most of the Mexican States have a variability of this 
component relatively high. There are few whose γ  is barely lesser than the one obtained 
with  the  overall  model.  This  component  is  compared  to  table  A2  that  contains  the 
proportions  of  employees  that  found  their  current  job  through  a  direct  or  indirect 
information source (as explained before). 
The discussion around chart A1 has a surprising implication in terms of the use of direct 
and indirect  job search mechanisms  or information  sources.  Even though the observed 
relation between γ  and the proportion of employed that found their current job through an 
indirect source contradicts the theory up to some extend. For low levels of the share of 
indirect  mechanisms  the  parameter  γ  takes  small  values,  as  seen  for  Michoacan  and 
Oxaca. Nonetheless, the trend line that was also plotted suggests a decreasing marginal 
relation between these two variables as long as the indirect share increases, as seen for 
Quintana and Nuevo Leon.  
The States that obtained the maximum and minimum values of γ  were Baja California and 
Oxaca,  respectively.  Table  9  is  now replicated  for  these  two  States  to  address  which 
covariates  are more correlated with the component  of wages attributable  to the market 
imperfections. These correlations exhibit a common pattern: they are significant and have 
the same sign for employees belonging to a labor union and holding a written contract, 
however, the significances of the firm size variables are only relevant for Oxaca. 
Partial correlations for iu
Baja California Oxaca
 Union member -0.1797 *** -0.0903 ***
 Written contract -0.0949 *** -0.0385 *
Jo
b 
se
ar
ch
Directly at the work place 0.0128  0.0365 *
At a private labor office 0.0176  0.0312
At a public labor office 0.0042  -0.0171 *
A temporary program of public jobs 0.0241  0.0041
A labor union or group 0.0089  0.0237
On line - Internet 0.0321 ** 0.0599 ***
A public announcement 0.0122  -0.0114
A friend or relative 0.0158  0.0259
Someone offered a vacant 0.0158  0.0595 ***
Other 0.0042  0.0809 ***
Fi
rm
 si
ze
1 person -0.008  -0.0724 ***
2 - 5 people -0.023  -0.0469 **
6 - 10 people -0.0159  -0.0136
11 - 15 people -0.0214  -0.0065
16 - 20 people -0.0125  -0.0139
21 - 30 people -0.0165  0.0022
31 - 50 people -0.0129  0.0196
51 - 100 people -0.0122  0.0085
101 - 250 people -0.0169  0.017
251 - 500 people -0.0164  0.0052
500 and more people -0.0165  0.0422 **
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%.
Table 12: Partial correlations for ui in Baja California and Oxaca.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009.
Surprisingly the signs of the first two variables are negative, in contrast of those presented 
in table 9. Besides, the union membership in Baja California obtained the highest partial 
correlation coefficient with a negative sign. This suggest that this kind of labor condition 
decreases the labor imperfection wage iu . 
Regarding the sources of information during the job search stage for employees located in 
these  two  regions,  it  turned  out  that  Internet  is  highly  correlated  with  the  market 
imperfection gain in both States. A possible conjecture for this finding is the existence of 
only one selected group of employees that have access to computers or afford all the cost 
that  it  takes  to  look  for  information  online.  Furthermore,  the  only  one  job  search 
mechanism and that  makes  de  difference  between  these  two States  is  the  information 
consultancy at public labor offices in Oxaca, which with a significance of 10% it obtained 
a negative sign (it is negatively correlated related with iu )
Finally, it is pointed out the importance of the firm size in Oxaca, where the prevalence of 
small or single worker firms leads a negative partial correlation in comparison to the rest of 
the firm sizes. As exception, larger firms yielded a positive sign, as seen for the overall 
nationwide model. 
5. Conclusions
This document presented an attempt to link the job search and job matching theory as a 
background of the wage formation process divided into three stages. Beginning with the 
reservation wage resulting from the labor supply and job search plans of potential workers; 
a subsequent bargaining moment and a further adjustment once they are completely hired. 
The National Survey on Employment from Mexico was explored to find the evidence of 
labor markets imperfection plausibly presented along those three stages. Adapting former 
studies of reservation wage estimation it was possible to subtract the part of the observable 
wages that corresponds to the wage gain of workers due to markets imperfections. It was 
estimated  that  82.7% of  the  variation  of  unexplained  wages  by  human  capital  among 
workers are caused by asymmetric information, monopsonic power, discrimination, and so 
on. 
The estimations were also obtained for Mexican States to identify which of them presents 
the highest and lowest variation of wages due to the presence of markets imperfections. 
This exercise led the analysis  to deeply explore the relations  between some theoretical 
variables  that  enable  the existence  of  a  proportion of  wages  that  are  not  explained  by 
human  capital  or  abilities.  It  turned  out  that  public  labor  offices  have  an  important 
diminishing  role  on  this  proportion  in  the  State  of  Oxaca.  At  the  same  time,  it  was 
observed that Internet is quite related to the augmentation of the mentioned wage gain. 
It  is  important  for  policy  makers  to  understand  de  dynamic  of  these  labor  market 
imperfections in terms of the firm size (although large firms are more susceptible to be 
regulated).  Indeed,  any  intervention  to  mitigate  this  situation  must  not  only  count  on 
workers’ characteristics but also on the conditions of the potential working place. 
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Appendix 1
Mexican States - Proportion of unemployed workers by search mechanism
Period: I-2009 II-2009
State Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
Aguascalientes 71.1% 27.5% 72.0% 27.3%
Baja California 87.6% 10.8% 87.2% 8.2%
Baja California Sur 80.5% 14.5% 91.1% 8.0%
Campeche 91.7% 3.9% 95.8% 3.2%
Coahuila de Zaragoza 91.4% 6.8% 86.1% 9.7%
Colima 88.7% 9.6% 89.8% 9.2%
Chiapas 95.2% 4.5% 93.0% 6.4%
Chihuahua 86.5% 6.1% 82.6% 6.4%
Distrito Federal 64.8% 30.4% 68.5% 30.5%
Durango 90.9% 8.6% 90.4% 8.9%
Guanajuato 76.8% 21.6% 81.9% 14.3%
Guerrero 83.9% 9.0% 91.7% 6.5%
Hidalgo 81.3% 17.6% 79.2% 19.8%
Jalisco 75.5% 22.3% 74.3% 22.1%
México 79.8% 18.6% 77.0% 21.5%
Michoacán de Ocampo 93.2% 5.9% 95.6% 3.4%
Morelos 79.1% 19.3% 80.3% 17.8%
Nayarit 89.9% 5.6% 90.8% 6.5%
Nuevo León 70.8% 24.9% 73.3% 22.6%
Oaxaca 93.5% 4.8% 93.0% 6.2%
Puebla 76.2% 22.7% 74.9% 24.1%
Querétaro Arteaga 76.5% 21.0% 77.5% 20.3%
Quintana Roo 65.1% 30.1% 74.0% 24.2%
San Luís Potosí 90.3% 8.5% 85.6% 14.1%
Sinaloa 85.2% 9.2% 80.2% 9.3%
Sonora 79.7% 18.5% 82.0% 14.3%
Tabasco 91.6% 4.9% 92.8% 5.0%
Tamaulipas 83.6% 14.5% 84.6% 11.6%
Tlaxcala 92.9% 6.5% 91.8% 4.7%
Veracruz Ignacio de la Llave 84.2% 14.5% 78.2% 17.0%
Yucatán 77.0% 16.7% 78.5% 20.0%
Zacatecas 90.8% 7.6% 91.1% 5.9%
Table A1: Unemployed workers - job search mechanisms.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
Mexican States - Proportion of employed by search mechanism
Period: I-2009
State Direct
Indirec
t
Aguascalientes 89.9% 10.1%
Baja California 89.0% 11.0%
Baja California Sur 93.7% 6.3%
Campeche 92.2% 7.8%
Coahuila de Zaragoza 92.0% 8.0%
Colima 95.4% 4.6%
Chiapas 96.1% 3.9%
Chihuahua 83.0% 17.0%
Distrito Federal 87.1% 12.9%
Durango 94.2% 5.8%
Guanajuato 90.7% 9.3%
Guerrero 94.8% 5.2%
Hidalgo 93.6% 6.4%
Jalisco 89.8% 10.2%
México 88.1% 11.9%
Michoacán de Ocampo 96.6% 3.4%
Morelos 92.1% 7.9%
Nayarit 95.8% 4.2%
Nuevo León 85.6% 14.4%
Oaxaca 94.4% 5.6%
Puebla 90.8% 9.2%
Querétaro Arteaga 88.8% 11.2%
Quintana Roo 86.3% 13.7%
San Luís Potosí 89.7% 10.3%
Sinaloa 93.1% 6.9%
Sonora 92.9% 7.1%
Tabasco 94.6% 5.4%
Tamaulipas 92.7% 7.3%
Tlaxcala 92.4% 7.6%
Veracruz Ignacio de la Llave 93.5% 6.5%
Yucatán 90.0% 10.0%
Zacatecas 95.8% 4.2%
Table A2: Unemployed workers - job search mechanisms.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
Appendix 2
Mexican States - Error term estimates
State  
2
uσ
2
vσ   γ η  pseudo R2
Aguascalientes 0.3833 0.0634 0.8580 -0.0019  0.2329
Baja California 6.4440 0.0870 0.9867 -0.0529 ** 0.2839
Baja California Sur 0.3099 0.1039 0.7489 -0.0008  0.1574
Campeche 0.5076 0.0958 0.8413 0.0075  0.1936
Coahuila de Zaragoza 2.0589 0.0811 0.9621 -0.0032  0.1861
Colima 0.2480 0.0871 0.7400 0.0608 ** 0.2241
Chiapas 0.2680 0.0847 0.7599 0.0611 ** 0.2778
Chihuahua 2.1359 0.1051 0.9531 -0.1493
**
* 0.2257
Distrito Federal 0.6448 0.1029 0.8624 -0.0539 ** 0.1911
Durango 0.4924 0.0829 0.8559 -0.0368  0.2236
Guanajuato 2.7899 0.0754 0.9737 0.0595 ** 0.3110
Guerrero 0.2751 0.0833 0.7676 0.0088  0.1330
Hidalgo 0.7335 0.1039 0.8759 -0.0229  0.2123
Jalisco 1.1176 0.0778 0.9349 -0.0356  0.2489
México 2.5794 0.0915 0.9658 -0.0441  0.2506
Michoacán de Ocampo 0.1646 0.0749 0.6874 -0.0237  0.2485
Morelos 0.8284 0.0697 0.9224 -0.0729 ** 0.2179
Nayarit 0.1650 0.0731 0.6931 -0.0093  0.2128
Nuevo León 0.8282 0.0773 0.9147 -0.0181  0.2133
Oaxaca 0.1292 0.0657 0.6629 -0.0143  0.2582
Puebla 0.5356 0.0851 0.8629 -0.0312  0.2180
Querétaro Arteaga 1.2001 0.0774 0.9394 -0.0131  0.2812
Quintana Roo 0.4988 0.1056 0.8252 0.0249  0.1584
San Luís Potosí 0.8415 0.0966 0.8970 -0.0155  0.1955
Sinaloa 0.3179 0.0788 0.8013 -0.0071  0.2063
Sonora 1.4101 0.1120 0.9264 -0.0479 * 0.2145
Tabasco 0.4073 0.0979 0.8062 0.0175  0.2170
Tamaulipas 0.3953 0.0953 0.8057 0.0178  0.1665
Tlaxcala 0.3633 0.0711 0.8363 -0.0796
**
* 0.2346
Veracruz Ignacio de la 
Llave 0.6104 0.0766 0.8885 -0.0330 ** 0.1792
Yucatán 0.5364 0.0706 0.8838 0.0020  0.1771
Zacatecas 0.4047 0.0856 0.8255 -0.0111  0.2161
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1%.
Table A3: Unemployed workers - job search mechanisms.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
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Chart A1: Plot of gamma and share of indirect search mechanisms.
Source: ENOE-INEGI. I-2009 and II-2009.
